Since the dismissal of High Court Chairman Xhezair Zaganjori by the Special Appeal Chamber on July 26, the High Court is now officially without President and with only a single judge left, Ardian Dvorani. Dvorani is at the same time member of the Justice Appointments Council (KED).
Zaganjori was confirmed a little over a year ago by the Independent Qualification Commission (KPK) despite considerable discrepancies in his asset declarations. The KPK argued that although some of the sales contracts for real estate presented by Zaganjori might have been “fictional,” he “did not aim to deceive.” The KPA has now judged otherwise.
In between his confirmation and final dismissal, Zaganjori has had a strong influence on the justice reform, in part because his key role in the establishment of the High Judicial Council (KLGj) in 2018. This is once again an example of a magistrate dismissed by the vetting having an influence on the new, “reformed” justice system. Zaganjori’s colleague Dvorani just recently stated that allowing judges to take place at the Constitutional Court that would be dismissed in appeal “wouldn’t honor the process.” Zaganjori’s important role in the justice reform didn’t either.
Zaganjori is the fourth magistrate dismissed while involved in the execution of the justice reform. Previously, judge of the Constitutional Court Bashkim Dedja was dismissed after being elected to the KED. Antoneta Sevdari was dismissed while already being a member of High Prosecutorial Council (KLP), while most recently, another KLP member, Gentjan Osmani, was dismissed by the KPA as well. Until his dismissal Osmani was allowed to be involved in the vetting and ranking of candidates for the Special Prosecution SPAK.
How can it be that a magistrate dismissed with final verdict by the vetting institutions has been allowed to be involved in the creation of the KLGj? How can it be that a dismissed magistrate could deliberate on the candidates for SPAK, on which all the internationals’ hopes are pinned? These dismissals are nothing but a sign that the lawgiver and its international “legal experts” have utterly failed in drafting legislation that would create a credible justice reform.
The whole point of the new justice governance institutions was that its members should be confirmed by the vetting before establishing them. Bad legislation, haste, and failure to meet deadlines has caused this to be otherwise. As a result, in this so-called “critical phase” of the justice reform – when was it not critical? – it is becoming increasingly clear that the justice governance institutions have been governed by those it should have excluded from the start.