The constitutional reform that Albanian Parliament approved a month ago was initiated and designed by the Soros-founded Open Society Foundation Albania. For this purpose, the Open Society Foundation Albania (OSFA) drafted in 2013 a strategy paper which outlined all necessary technical and political steps that needed to be taken in order to carry out to reform of the Albanian Constitution.
Thousands of leaked files and emails related to George Soros’ Open Society Foundation were released by DC Leaks last week. Among these files, there are dozens of documents related to the Open Society Foundation Albania, including an important one, titled Open Society Foundation Albania (OSFA) 2014-2017 Strategy Plan (a copy of the document can be accessed here).
The document—drafted in the summer 2013, following the win by the Edi Rama’s socialists in the June elections, but before his government was officially sworn in—outlines OSFA’s strategy, initiative and projects for the next 4-year period, which coincides with the Rama government’s term.
According to the strategy, the main OSFA intervention would be the implementation of Albania’s constitutional reform, described as one of the “big ideas” that the Foundation would advance.
The strategic document describes in ample detail the contents of this project for a “general review” and change of the Constitution, as well as the ways how it would be implemented.
The main objectives, as defined in the document, were:
- Strengthening of the checks and balances between the legislative, executive and judicial branches;
- strengthening of the role of the President;
- reducing political influence in the appointment judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Court
- increasing the independence of public institutions such as the General Prosecutor’s office, the Statistical Office, and the Ombudsperson
The document predicts that “[by] the end of 2014 the [Soros] Foundation will have undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the Constitution chapters that need to be revised, including the identification of best practices and processes from other countries constitutions and their potential applicability to the Albanian context.”
It also planned that, by 2015, OSFA would “put forth a preliminary set of constitutional reform proposals developed by a broad-based and representative pool of stakeholders. […] Ideally, within four years the fruits of this campaign will result in a positive constitutional reform. […] If the constitution has not yet been amended, the coalition will infuse this campaign into the 2017 election cycle through public discussions, debates, petitions and new media campaigns.”
OSFA seemed to deem fundamental reaching the political consensus of all parties, being aware that Constitution change would need 94 parliamentary votes. To this end, it planned the use of several approaches for reaching this consensus – ranging from attempts at dialogue, to using international pressure against politicians.
The Foundation also planned on including international actors in Albania, like the Venice Commission, the CoE, and the EU Delegation, in the process of drafting and passing the amended Constitution.
The OSFA strategy acknowledged that “the EU and US have significant influence and leverage in Albania and OSFA will lobby them to demand the re-establishment of sufficient checks and balances in the country (including making this a condition for further EU accession negotiations).”
It also placed great importance on forging a public coalition that would support the constitutional reform. To this purpose, the document planned that OSFA will seek out and obtain the support of several NGOs and individuals, labelled “civic partners” in the document, to help in raising public awareness and consensus towards the reform. Among these civic partners, the document names “the Civil Forum (of Former Albanian Presidents), former authors of the constitution, law faculties, etc.”
OSFA attempts at influencing public opinions would include “citizen petitions, […] university debates, and media campaigns around this issue.”
The document emphasised: “now is the optimal time for the foundation to seize the momentum and begin its push for constitutional reform.” OSFA seems convinced that it is “the best-placed organization in Albania to take on this challenge. It has the convening power required to corral the multitude of domestic and international actors needed for this campaign.”
This internal document reveals that the constitutional reform had been discussed with Prime Minister-elect Edi Rama, who had “pledged to reform the constitution. OSFA will work with [the government] – where possible and appropriate – to hold it to this commitment, while working to lead and shape its outcome.”
Now, more than three years after OSFA’s plan was drafted, it is clear that the justice reform has followed the blueprint set fotrh in it, in almost perfect manner.
Some of the important bullet points planned in the OSFA document that have already been executed include:
- An assessment of the constitution by a group of experts supported and financed by OSFA was carried out in 2014, as predicted in the strategy.
- The project the reform was based on, that was used as the foundation of later discussion and changes, was drafted and presented by OSFA-backed experts in 2015.
- The Venice Commission became involved in the reform process.
- The EU (or at least the Tirana Delegation) and the US were main actors in achieving political consensus using pressure when necessary.
- The constitutional reform became a condition for opening EU accession negotiations.
- International institutions pressured local political powers into carrying out the reform.
- Civil society organizations came out in support of the reform, organizing public protests.
- Petitions supporting the reform were signed by intellectuals and several intellectuals publicly came out in support of the reform, whose contents were never publicly elaborated on.
- The reform was pushed on the media, especially social ones, via a vigorous campaign.
Equally meaningful are those OSFA predictions that failed to come true, particularly:
- In contrast to OSFA’s initial objective, the reform that ended up passing, not only did not strengthen the role of the president, but practically transformed it into a nominal figure, with no true power in the country’s political system.
- Instead of increasing checks and balances between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, the reform ended up further weakening what power the legislative and judiciary held, in favour of the executive.
One could speculate that these important deviations are OSFA’s concessions to Prime Minister Rama.
Finally, it is important to note that those who drafted the plan to reform the Constitution were aware of the difficulty of such an enterprise. “Pushing for constitutional reform is always a risky gambit” the strategic document warns. “The constitution could potentially end up in worse shape than it is now.”
Now that OSFA has “successfully” executed its “big idea” to reform Albania’s constitution, all that remains is to hope that this ominous warning doesn’t come true.
