All debates that have accompanied the judicial reform have considered the risk that in the implementation of the reform the government would profit from its power to put its own people in key positions within the new justice system, thus alienating from the beginning the concept of political independence of the courts and justice in general.
Now that the reform has entered the implementation phase, Parliament approved with unanimous votes the composition of the vetting commission, bringing to the surface unexpected scenarios that pose a risk to the reform by turning it into an means for “state capture,” placing the state institutions under the control of a group of people that use it for their own private gains.
The organization of the justice system, approved with law 155/2016 (one of those laws approved in violation of the political agreement between majority and opposition mediated by the internationals), created new centers of power, which may prove decisive for the realization of these unacceptable political aims.
The High Inspectorate of Justice
For example, the power of the two self-administered justice institutions, the High Judicial Council (KLGj) and the High Prosecutorial Council (KLP) will be nearly completely in the hands of the High Inspectorate of Justice (ILD), which in fact is turned into an executive institution. At the request of the relevant institutions (KLGj, KLP, General Prosecutor, directors of court and local prosecutions, and the Ministry of Justice), but also at the request of ordinary citizens, the the High Inspector investigates and proposes disciplinary procedures against all functionaries within the justice system (including members of the KLGj, KLP, and General Prosecution), which afterward may be required to judge the cases brought forward by the ILD.
An extraordinary power to investigate, to find or not to find, that turns the ILD into the true “lord” of justice, able to remove any judges, also because of the fact that it is able to frighten the members of the KLGj and KLP that will have to judge these cases.
The secure its independence, the law envisions that the High Inspector is nominated by the Parliament on the basis of a candidate list ordered by the Council of Nominations after a public process and will remain in function for 9 years without the right for reelection; that he is well paid and his office is given a budget and new staff by the Parliament, with the interesting particularity that he is also allowed to accept funds or gifts from others “under the conditions that there is no conflict of interest between the donor and the activity of the inspector.” But who has the power to determine whether there is a conflict of interest or not, because the law doesn’t envision such as situation!
Of course in order to guarantee his capability and independence, the Inspector needs to fulfill a series of requirements, such as having completed a Master in Law degree, 15 years of working experience as legal professional, no criminal past, no dismissal from office for disciplinary reasons, not having exercised political functions in public institutions or political parties during the past 10 years, not having been a secret service official or collaborator with foreign secret services.
His position is irreconcilable with any other public function, with any private business, with any type of paid professional activity (excluding teaching), with membership of a political party, with participation in public activities organized by political parties, and with membership of any type of organization, non-profit or commercial.
So, we’re talking about a “virgin in the justice system” to occupy such a delicate and powerful position, which is difficult to find.
The candidates
But within the environs of the justice system, in the hushed conversations of lawyers and judges, a few names have started to surface. The names whispered by Socialist legal professionals that took part in the preparation of the judicial reform have quickly come into the focus of “international experts,” who, not knowing them, have started to gather information from friends and acquaintances. That’s how these names started to circulate in a semi-public manner.
The three unofficial candidates are Ilir Panda, Gent Ibrahimi, and Artur Metani, but it seems that the first one has only been added to make room for the other two. Except the fact that they are well-known legal professionals, they have all three been part of the commission nominated by Rama to write the text of the judicial reform and are known as close to the Socialist Party, a “risky” characteristic in view of the power balance within the reform. This doesn’t only put them in a conflict of interest but also makes them responsible for the drafting of a problematic reform. But what is disconcerting is the fact that several of these names belong to people close to Socialist officials,
So, for a delicate position, which would require a large and credible distance from political power, the only names that are circulating belong to people related to the government, even by blood.
According to the law, their family relations do not constitute an incompatibility, because the law, like the ones who prepared it, does not envision exclusion in case of even direct family relations with ministers or political leaders.
Maybe we shouldn’t be talking about “state capture” but only about feudal attempts at dividing power between several families, family members, and nepotism, just like in any medieval story – but where is the justice in all of this?
